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FOREWORD
Tax exempt status for charitable organizations has been a part of our fed-
eral income tax system froin its inception and a deduction for contributions
to such organizations has been a part of the income tax since 1917. As Ken-
neth Liles and Cynthia Blum document in their article, these provisions have
been controversial parts of the tax system throughout their existence.' Large
concentrations of wealth in private foundations have evoked concern, it
appears, because they have been used, at the direction of a relatively few pri-
vate citizens, to carry out quasi-public functions and have, therefore, present-
ed a threat to the concentration of power over public policy decisions in elec-
ted public officials. Thus, what many persons view as a healthy contribution to
to a "pluralistic society," not entirely reliant on governments for establishing
society's priorities, others see as an undemocratic transfer of power from the
body politic to a few individuals who happen to have great wealth.
There may be merit in both views. The decision to tax or not to tax any
particular organization cannot be made without an allocation of society's re-
sources between public and private control. Likewise, the decision to permit
or deny a deduction for charitable contributions cannot be made without giv-
ing individuals either more or less discretion in how they use their own finan-
cial resources. Our tax system has been generous in permitting individuals to
choose within the limits of supporting the public fisc or private philanthropy,
and this is undeniably undemocratic. When members of Congress, with con-
stituencies predominantly composed of individuals with little choice of this
type, observe privately controlled resources being used in ways they believe
to be less than optimum, or indeed, downright harmfful to society, it is under-
standable that they might attack tax exemptions and deductions for charitable
contributions as resulting in an unwarranted transfer of power from the body
politic to private hands.
On the other hand, dlemocracy is not merely a political system for concen-
trating all decisions in governmental instittutions. Indeed, it may function
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best when it leaves as much decisional authority in private hands as possible
without being neglectful of the welfare of its citizens. It is not much of a leap
from this premise to the idea that diversity of private choice is so valuable to a
democracy that it would be unwise not to encourage it by the very transfer of
power that some find objectionable. Few would deny that private philanthro-
py has done much good in this country and many would agree with the follow-
ing view of Douglas Dillon concerning the role of philanthropy, as well as his
conclusion:2
The fact is that foundation innovations have set the pace for nany activ-
ities which have long since ceased to be regarded as philanthropy at all. What
is philanthropic today may be far from it tonmorrow. When the Carnegie
Foundation for Teaching set up its first retirement pension for teachers, this
was philanthropy. But the pension systems now supplied by every college in
the land are a cost of doing business, and in no way philanthropic. The nil-
lions raised by the Prosser Committee in the early thirties as philanthropy have
been replaced by the welfare system as public policy. The provision of social
security is now considered just as much a public obligation as is the furnishing
of police and fire protection .... Surely we should be doing everything in our
power to encourage foundations to continue these types of activities.
Lawrence M. Stone, recognizing the merits of both of these views, pro-
poses a solution to balance the public and private interests. The freedom en-
joyed by private foundations to make private decisions in committing their
endownments to alternative public purposes he describes as being "at once
[their] greatest virtue and [their] most vulnerable vice."3 Stone notes a num-
ber of areas where government regulation of private foundations is not only
appropriate but should pose no threat to their independence. But he views
maintenance of their freedom to make private decisions in allocating their
resources as absolutely essential to their ability to function in the pioneering
manner which Dillon describes.' Although Stone proposes a variety of changes
in the structure of governance of private foundations to reduce the conflict
between public and private interests, the lynchpin of his system appears to be
limiting the period of time during which creators of foundations can exert
control or substantial influence over their operations.
The somewhat disparate points of view over the effect of the tax laws on
financing education presented in the articles by Julian H. Levi and by John B.
Kirkwood and David S. Mundel reflect in some degree this same conflict. Levi
analyzes the different nature of private and public support for higher educa-
tion in terms of the reliability of that support as well as the freedom each gives
2. Dillon, The Role of Private Philanthropy in Modern American Society, in TAX INSTITUTE OF
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to educational institutions in allocating their resources.5 He concludes that
private support is so essential to excellence and diversity in higher education
that tax incentives to encourage this support should be broadened. He finds
this not only an efficient way to finance education but well worth whatever
costs may be incurred by the public in giving up tax revenues.
On the other hand, Kirkwood and Mundel analyze private and public
support for education in terms of the differences in the way the private sec-
tor and governments might allocate resources devoted to education.' This
quite directly poses the question of whether the majority of people in this
country might be better served by a more democratic decisional process with
respect to the allocation of funds devoted to education. The average voter, if
familiar with the stakes, might well choose to exercise more control over this
allocation by reducing tax incentives and electing representatives to allocate
the resulting larger tax revenues.
These two articles present an interesting contrast in their views of the con-
cept of tax expenditures, a concept that has been hotly debated in recent
years.' Professor Stanley S. Surrey deserves credit for promoting the idea that
tax preferences, including exemptions from tax as well as the charitable con-
tribution deduction, are a means by which the government spends money or
subsidizes certain activities." Levi, however, joins the critics of this concept and
points out that its implicit assumption is "reminiscent of the assumptions upon
which feudal societies were organized."" Kirkwood and Mundel, on the other
hand, find Surrey's analysis irrefutable. Whether or not one agrees with the
concept, it is clear that it has gained wide acceptance. As Levi notes, it has
been accepted by Congress which now requires the annual budget of the
United States to include a tax expenditure budget. It has also been accepted,
at least implicitly, by a number of courts, including the Supreme Court, as a
basis for deciding constitutional issues in a variety of tax cases."' And, else-
where in this issue, it draws the approval of Lawrence M. Stone and of Charles
J. Goetz and Gordon Brady.
Robert S. Bromberg approaches this subject-the effect of tax laws on the
financing of Health care-from a somewhat different vantage point." He
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proceeds from the premise that nonprofit hospitals need an expanding base
of financial resources in order to serve the health needs of the country and
that tax preferences are not only appropriate but necessary in meeting this
goal. He then analyzes the term "charitable" as used in the exemption and ed-
ucation provisions of the Code to consider what types of nonprofit hospitals
should be accorded these tax preferences. He argues that the traditional basis
for preferential treatment, the use of available financial resources to provide
free or below-cost care for indigent patients, is no longer appropriate. The
implication of this is that health care for indigents should become an obliga-
tion of the government, funded by tax revenues, at the same time that re-
sources allocated by favored tax treatment can now appropriately be directed
to the exclusive benefit of those able to pay for their own health care. Brom-
berg's argument is in support of a rulings policy announced by the Internal
Revenue Service in 1969. That change in administrative policy, made with-
out a change in the statute, is a prime example of a resource allocation deci-
sion that could not muster enough support in Congress to be endorsed by
specific legislation which was, in fact, proposed in 1969.1'
The article bv Liles and Blunt discloses that there has long been concern
over attempts by exempt organizations to influence legislation. They note that
this concern prompted the Treasury to restrict this activity as a condition of
exemption fifteen years before Congress added its legislative stamp of ap-
proval to such restrictions. The controversy has sharpened in recent years and
is the subject of the article by Mortimer M. Caplin and Richard Timbie. a
They note that the national and state governments have involved themselves
in so many areas of legitimate concern to charitable organizations that their
range of activities may be unreasonably, and perhaps unconstitutionally, nar-
rowed by the existing restrictions with respect to legislative activities.
Charles J. Goetz and Gordon Brady examine the effect of these restrictions
on citizen interest groups and the consequent effect on formation of environ-
mental policy.1 Their economic analysis leads them to the interesting conclu-
sion that the restriction on legislative activities has had little effect on the abil-
ity of these groups to influence legislative policy. They then observe that
12. H.R. 13270. 91st Cong.. 1st Sess.. as passed bv the House of Representatives. contained a
provision in section 101 that would have conformed the Internal Revente Code to the Treasury's
ruling. It was stricken from the bill by the Senate Finance Committee. explaining that it wished to
reexamine the matter in connection with pending legislation on Medicare and Medicaid. SENATE
COMM. ON FINANcE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1969).
Subsequently, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee strongly recommended revocation of the
ruling. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SFSS., IEDICARE AND MEDICAID
-PROBILEIS, ISSUES. AND ALTERNATIVES 58 (COmmlll. Ptint 1970). To date, no action has been
taken.
13. Caplin & Timbie, LegislatiVe Activities oj Public Charities, 39 LAW & CONrEMP. PROB. no. 4,
at 183 (1975).
14. Goetz & Brady, Environmental Policy Formation and the Tax Treatment of Citizen Interest Groups.
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 211 (1975).
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judicial and administrative actions create law which may have as great an im-
pact on society as does legislation and argue that it makes little sense to restrict
exempt organizations in attempting to influence the latter and not the former.
Finally, they suggest that attempts to influence judicial or administrative law,
in situations where the outcome is controversial, might be more appropriately
restricted than attempts to influence a national or state consensus in their re-
spective legislatures.
Many other criticisms of the operations of exempt organizations, and par-
ticularly private foundations, are revealed in the article by Liles and Blum as
well as in the article by Stone. These include delay in the expenditure of funds
accumulated for charitable purposes, diversions of such funds to private uses,
business competition with fully taxed businesses, and control of private busi-
nesses. All were subjects of the complex regulatory scheme imposed on pri-
vate foundations by the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.15 This Act
has been widely criticized as hostile to private philanthropy and its impact has
provoked a great deal of concern. Martin Worthy's article is an outline of that
regulatory scheme and an expression of the concern it has evoked. 16 Homer
C. Wadsworth, who has long been involved in the management of large com-
munity foundations, also examines the impact of the 1969 legislation on
private foundations.17 Although he obviously shares some of Worthy's concerns,
he also finds a number of positive developments which have resulted from
this legislation.
Private philanthropy has a long history in this country. It antedates the
income tax and would undoubtedly continue, if not flourish, without the pref-
erential tax treatment it now enjoys. The country can ill afford to weaken pri-
vate philanthropy unnecessarily. But it seems healthy that the country is
examining it criticially and, now, realizing that there is a price to be paid for its
benefits. It is hoped that this symposium will contribute to this examination
to a more rational determination of the future of private philanthropy's rela-
tionship to the federal tax system.
RICHARD D. HOBBET
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